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Abstract
We discuss the hypothesis that the debate about the interpretation of the orthodox for-
malism of quantum mechanics (QM) might have been misguided right from the start by a
biased metaphysical interpretation of the formalism and its inner mathematical relations.
In particular, we focus on the orthodox interpretation of the congruence relation, ‘=’, which
relates equivalent classes of different mathematical representations of a vector in Hilbert
space, in terms of metaphysical identity. We will argue that this seemingly “common sense”
interpretation, at the semantic level, has severe difficulties when considering the syntactic
level of the theory.
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Introduction
In this paper we question whether the so called “minimal interpretation” of the formalism of
quantum mechanics (QM) might have been misguided by a biased metaphysical interpretation
of the mathematical formalism and its inner relations. This goes clearly against the idea ac-
cording to which it is possible to “read literally” an interpretation of QM from the formalism
alone, or in other words, that the mathematical formalism of QM has a “transparent” metaphys-
ical (or conceptual) reading. In particular, we will analyze the general interpretation given to
the equality sign ‘=’ in the orthodox quantum formalism which relates different mathematical
representations of a vector in Hilbert space.
We will argue that a mathematical formalism alone is not constrained by any sort of meta-
physical commitment. In physical theories, the metaphysical understanding must be added to
the formalism in such a way that specific physical concepts provide a coherent representation of
what is going on according to the theory. The uncritical application of inadequate concepts to an
abstract formalism might produce not only a misunderstanding of the mathematical structure
but also different pseudoproblems. This might be the case within the foundational debates about
QM where the orthodox formalism has been understood in terms of metaphysical identity. Con-
trary to this widespread (metaphysical) interpretation, we will provide arguments which show
that the equivalent classes of a vector in Hilbert space (related through the congruence relation,
‘=’) cannot, in general, be regarded as making reference to a metaphysical identity. Even though
we remark that we are not discussing here the well known problem of identical or indistinguish-
able particles in QM (see [1, 11, 25]), our analysis will have deep consequences for that debate
which we attempt to discuss in a future work.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we introduce and discuss the axiomatization
and meaning of formal theories as related to metaphysical schemes, in particular we will consider
the notion of identity. In section 2 we discuss the notion of identification within mathematical
structures and relate it to metaphysical identity. Section 3 analyses the relation between logical
and metaphysical principles. In section 4 we distinguish the syntactic and semantic levels of a
theory making special emphasis on the fact that while the former level is symbolic and abstract, it
is the latter level which introduces a language that implies a specific metaphysical or conceptual
interpretation of such symbols. Section 5, discusses the application of metaphysical identity to
QM and the problems it gives rise to when considering the contextual relation between multiple
mathematical representations of a vector.
1 Axiomatization, Meaning and Identity
In certain sense, the meaning of a formalized or only partially formalized theory T is implicitly
given by the axiomatic systematization of T . The primitive concepts and primitive propositions
of T , plus its underlying logic, fix the possible models of T and the possible meanings of its
primitive concepts and of its primitive propositions (axioms). The remaining concepts of T
have to be explicitly introduced by explicit (nominal) definitions. In fact, the axiomatization of
T constitutes an implicit definition of the possible systems of objects of which the theory talks
about. T has, in principle, various (infinite) different interpretations, that is, logically different
models. In consequence, the primitive concepts and propositions of T may acquire various
special, primitive, meanings.1 The same also occurs when T is extended to several stronger
theories. Therefore if the meaning of a theory is determined by its axiomatization, its deductive
structure, then in the stronger theory the meanings of the corresponding concepts need to differ
from those of the initial theory. Diverse axiomatizations entail unlike kinds of meaning.
Commonly, the above view of the meaning of theories is not extended to logic itself. While
the meanings of the specific notions of theories are, so to say, relative, the logical notions are
absolute, and remain strictly the same in all interpretations (of the primitive concepts and the
axioms). Our main thesis is that the central notions of a logical system L, for instance the
classical predicate calculus of first order with equality, has diverse meanings, which depend on
the theory whose logic is L. That is, the meaning has a global signification, being in some sense
relative. For example, the meaning of the quantifiers in a standard mathematical theory and
their meaning in QM, are globally different. The standard conception of the logical notions, as
fixed and immutable, can only be uphold by an appeal to a metaphysical stance.2
All the above considerations apply in particular to the case of the concept of mathematical
identity (or equality). However the situation of this kind of notion presents an extra complica-
tion, that we now discuss. To begin with, mathematical identity is an equivalence relation, and
if a theory T contains the equality symbol ‘=’, it may refer to some equivalence relation and
not to a metaphysical identity. However, if T possesses an equivalence relation ≡, it has also an
interpretation of ≡ as a possible metaphysical identity. Concequently, if T does contain this sec-
ond kind of identity, then it has an interpretation according to which the metaphysical identity
is, in fact, only an equivalence relation. In general, we don’t have at our disposition a process
to distinguish these situations. Formally, we are unable to characterize the concept of identity;
analogously, if we try to employ semantic methods, say standard semantics, we are supposed to
apply set-theoretic methods that are formulated inside a set theory, and the problem reappears.
1Notice that there two senses of “meaning”: meaning provided by the axiomatization, that is, by the syntactical
structure of the theory, and meaning as attributed by an interpretation. The two are obviously not equal.
2In connection with non-classical logics, the global aspect of meaning seems clearer.
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In this paper we attempt to distinguishing metaphysical identity from equivalence relations.
We will show that if we are not rigorous in this respect, we surely will commit significant
equivocations and mistakes. In fact, the orthodox interpretation of QM might have produced
this kind of error by uncritically presupposing an interpretation of mathematical equivalence
classes in terms of a metaphysical identity.
Identity is a ‘strong’ equivalence relation. So, it is supposed to be reflexive, symmetric,
transitive and to satisfy the replacement scheme:
x = y → (F (x)↔ F (y)) (1)
where the notations have the usual meanings. We are restricting the analysis to classical first-
order logic with identity, and we will denote by L such a logic and by L its language. All
instances of the scheme or principle of replacement belong to L and this scheme is, therefore,
language dependent; consequently, if we change the language, the principle above also changes.
In other words, the global meaning of identity is dependent of the language employed.
Let I be an interpretation of the language L of a (first-order) theory T , whose logic is L. T
divides the domain of I in equivalence classes as follows: two members of the domain, x and y,
belong to the same equivalence class if and only if
F (x)↔ F (y) (2)
is true according to I for all formulas F of the language L, under clear qualifications. It is
easy, then, to show that the equivalence classes constitute the basic domain of an interpretation
I ′ which is a model of T , when appropriate definitions are employed. Procedures like this
demonstrate that if in an interpretation of a theory the symbol of identity is interpreted as the
metaphysical identity, then there is another interpretation in which the same symbol denotes a
strong equivalence relation, and conversely.
We make here only some references concerning higher-order predicate logic:
i. The notion of mathematical identity is delimitated by a theory of types. Otherwise, we can
reproduce the Russell paradoxes for predicates and relations.
ii. The semantics of higher-order logics normally presuppose set theory, which is a first-order
theory, and we meet again the relative character of identity.
iii. The logical semantics of a given language is developed in a meta-language which includes
identity and in its rigorous formulation doesn’t fix the meaning of identity.
We arrive at the conclusion that in first-order or in higher-order logic it is not possible to
characterize, univocally, the concept of absolute identity. In order to do that, we must appeal
to metaphysical principles. In fact, the analysis and discussions of principles like identity, the
indistinguishability of identicals, and the identity of indistinguishables, involve us into deep
metaphysical problems, with repercussions throughout logic and physics. In this paper we will
apply this analysis to the specific case of QM, where the distinction between the formal and
metaphysical (or interpretational) levels of discourse have been presupposed in the orthodox
literature right from the start.
The preceding discussion could be extended to cover most systems of non classical logic, for
instance, intuitionistic logic and paraconsistent logic. However this will be left to a future work.
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2 Formal Identification
Identification is an operation that belongs to the theory of mathematical structures. We present
here, for the sake of completeness, a rough outline of the concept of (mathematical) structure (see
[6] and [9]). A scale of sets on a finite number of initial sets is a finite sequence of sets, such that
each of them is an initial set or is obtained from preceding sets of the sequence by forming power
sets or cartesian products, according to a scheme of formation. Let M be a scale of sets based
on, say, sets A, B and C; let us suppose that we have formulated a list of propositions, called
axioms, expressing set theoretic properties of a generic element of M , and let us, also, denote
by T the intersection of the subsets of M defined by such properties. Any element of T defines
a structure of species T on A, B and C. Therefore a structure is determined by the scheme
of M , from the base sets A, B and C, and the axioms of the structure. Groups, topological
spaces, fields, Hilbert spaces, von Neumann algebras, real numbers, complex numbers, etc., are
all of them mathematical structures. Further, it is not difficult to define a product of structures,
isomorphism of structures, etc.
Bourbaki introduces the concept of identification as follows, considering only structures with
one base set (but it is easy to extend the definition to the case of various sets):
“When there exists an isomorphism f of a set E, endowed with a structure G, onto a set
E′, endowed with a structure G′, it is often convenient to identify E with E′, i.e., to give
the same name to an element of a set M in the scale based on E and to the element which
is its image under the appropriate extension of f to the set M .” [6, p. 385]
All these ideas may be found in the Summary of Results of Bourbaki [6, pp. 347-385].
In the bulk of his book, Bourbaki presents a different concept of structure, more general and
more sophisticated. However, the notion really employed in common mathematics is the one
of the Summary. There is yet another concept of mathematical structure introduced by Ch.
Ehremann, the ‘functorial’ concept of structure (see [7]). A careful study of identification in
topological spaces is contained in [27, pp. 42-43].
Classical mathematics is based on set theory and its central objects are mathematical struc-
tures. Taking into account the above considerations, mathematical identity may be interpreted
as a strong equivalence relation or congruence, and not only as a metaphysical identity. In
particular, if two structures are mathematically identical, this does not mean that they are also
metaphysically identical. The objects of classical mathematics are, fundamentally, structures;
from the abstract point of view, the objects of classical mechanics and of quantum mechanics
are structures. So, when identity appears in these two different physical theories, it is not, nec-
essarily, absolute identity, which implies a metaphysical interpretation, but simply a congruence
relation. In this way, from the abstract point of view, equality or identity, in the theory of Hilbert
spaces can be seen as a congruence. Therefore, the equality expressing the decomposition of a
vector in some base, may also constitute a congruence.
All those remarks are reinforced by the true meaning of the identification in connection with
structures. Identification, so common in pure mathematics, usually refers to a question of des-
ignation, a convention concerning the employment of names. For instance, the real numbers,
conceived either as sequences of rationals, or as cuts à la Dedekind in the field of rational num-
bers, are identified. Thus they are, so to say, “the same thing”. So, identifcation in mathematics
has nothing to do with the notion of metaphysical identity.
Now that we have discussed identity within formal theories we will turn our attention in the
following section to the more general relation between logical and metaphysical principles.
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3 Logical Identity and Metaphysical Identity
Logic and physics have been intimately related since their origin. It was Aristotle who created
classical logic and used it in order to develop his own physical and metaphysical scheme, pro-
viding a solution to the problem of movement and knowledge set down —according to both
Plato and Aristotle— by the Heraclitean and Eleatic schools of thought. Movement was then
accounted by Aristotle in terms of his hylomorphic scheme, as the path from a potential (unde-
termined, contradictory and non-identical) realm to an actual (determined, non-contradictory
and identical) realm of existence. The notion of entity was then characterized by three main
logical and ontological principles: the Principle of Existence (PE) which allowed Aristotle to
claim existence about that which is predicated, the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) which
permitted him to argue that the existent possesses non-contradictory properties, and the Prin-
ciple of Identity (PI) which allowed him to claim that the predicated non-contradictory existent
is “the same”, or remains “identical to itself”, through time. As Verelst and Coecke make the
point:
“The three fundamental principles of classical (Aristotelian) logic: the existence of objects
of knowledge, the principle of contradiction and the principle of identity, all correspond to
a fundamental aspect of his ontology. This is exemplified in the three possible usages of
the verb to be’: existential, predicative, and identical. The Aristotelian syllogism always
starts with the affirmation of existence: something is. The principle of contradiction then
concerns the way one can speak (predicate) validly about this existing object, i.e. about the
true and falsehood of its having properties, not about its being in existence. The principle
of identity states that the entity is identical to itself at any moment (a=a), thus granting
the stability necessary to name (identify) it.” [33, p. 172] (emphasis added)
PI made possible —at the metaphysical level— the constitution of the notion of entity as “some-
thing” which is metaphysically identical to itself. It is this architectonic which allows all par-
ticular representations of an entity to be related to itself, as a unity, as a sameness. However,
regardless of its common origin and deep interrelation, it should be clear that even though logic
and metaphysics might be interrelated, logical schemes are not necessarily nor uniquely related
to particular metaphysical schemes. This is not a “self evident” relation.
For many centuries it was dogmatically assumed that classical logic was the “true logic” of our
world, the only guide of rational thought, the formal apparatus for correct reasoning. However,
the revolution in the foundations of mathematics and logic that took place at the beginning
of the 20th Century produced a whole new group of non-classical logics. Paraconsistent logics,
non-reflexive logics, fuzzy logics, etc., where all developed breaking the exclusive ruling of the
Aristotelian principles (see [8, 12, 37]). Thus it became clear that the fundament of “correct”
reasoning was neither firm nor “self evident”. This proliferation of logics made also possible to
understand more clearly the complex relation between formal languages and physical theories.
In fact, the revolution that took place in logic has a clear counterpart in the foundations of
physics where also new theories were created with different metaphysical standpoints to those of
classical physics. While Relativity theory deconstructed classical Newtonian absolute space and
time and produced a new Riemannian entangled space-time, QM presented serious difficulties
to interpret the formalism in terms of “classical reality” —i.e., in terms of PE, PNC and PI.
We now turn our attention to the important distinction, within theories, between syntax and
semantics. This distinction will allow us to make explicit, in the following sections, the problem
we attempt to expose regarding the applicability of metaphysical identity within the orthodox
interpretation of QM.
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4 Syntactic and Semantic Levels
Any theory T is built in a language L. L has two basic dimensions: The syntactic and the
semantic. The former concerns the symbolic, syntactic part of L; it constitutes a kind of
geometry of symbols. The latter deals with the interpretation of L and, indirectly, of T . The
semantics of T reflects, then, a particular interpretation of T (and of L) including the denotation
of its terms and the truth of its sentences. Consequently, the symbol for identity, that T is
supposed to possess, presents also two levels: the syntactical and the semantical levels. The
usual syntactic properties of identity are reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity and substitution, as
mentioned above. However, these fundamental properties don’t characterize identity completely,
since the theory T , that contains an identity symbol, has semantic interpretations in which this
symbol can be interpreted in different ways.
There exists, so to say, a kind of pluralism concerning the interpretation of identity and, as
we already noted, this pluralism encompasses all logical notions which, leaving aside a clearly
metaphysical stance, do not have a unique, possible interpretation (and, therefore, meaning).
There exists no (strong) argument to rule out the metaphysical interpretation of identity in
most cases, in particular in logic and mathematics. However, the usual properties of the identity
symbol are not enough to guarantee that its interpretation should be necessarily provided in
terms of metaphysical identity. In effect, a theory like T , as mentioned above, based on first-
order logic with identity, if consistent, has models in which identity may be interpreted as a
strict congruence; i.e., it isn’t the relation of metaphysical identity. The same remains true if
the underlying logic of T is higher order logic or set theory.
The choice of a specific language implies also the choice of a particular semantic and meta-
physical scheme. Language, semantics and metaphysics come all together. Every notion of the
language must be rigorously defined for the lack of such a precise definition of the meaning of
notions (e.g. ‘individual’, ‘object’, ‘state’, etc.) would preclude the very possibility of analysis
of such notions. These definitions are not in the syntactical level, they are in the semantical one.
As we have discussed above, the relation between a mathematical structure, in the syntactic
level, and a metaphysical conceptual scheme, in the semantic level, is not a “self evident” relation
or something which can be “literally read” from the syntactic level.
Each theory T requires the development and creation of specific interrelations between the
syntactical and semantical levels. One could argue, following an instrumentalist perspective,
that such a relation is completely unnecessary in the case of physical theories. In fact, there is
no consensus within the specialized literature regarding the question over the necessity or not to
interpret mathematical formalisms like that of QM (e.g. [32, 30]). For example, Fuchs and Peres
[24, p. 70] have argued, in a paper entitled Quantum Theory Needs No ‘Interpretation’, that
“[...] quantum theory does not describe physical reality. What it does is provide an algorithm for
computing probabilities for the macroscopic events (“detector clicks”) that are the consequences
of experimental interventions. This strict definition of the scope of quantum theory is the only
interpretation ever needed, whether by experimenters or theorists.” This instrumentalist per-
spective is satisfied with having an “algorithmic recipe” that allows the physicist to calculate
measurement outcomes from the formalism. Here, the semantic level seems to require a mini-
mum of structure since there is no need to supplement the theory with an interpretation that
would conceptually explain its relation to physical reality. However, in this case the relation
between the syntax of a theory and experience becomes highly problematic. In fact, abstract
mathematical symbols provide no guide of how to interpret them in terms of physical notions.
For example, the theory of calculus does not contain the physical notions of Newtonian mechan-
ics. One cannot find “hidden” between the abstract symbols of calculus the physical concepts of
‘space’, ‘time’, ‘inertia’, ‘mass”, etc.
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On the very contrary, we view it that one of the basic tasks of the physicists and philosophers
of physics is to produce theories which provide physical representations which allow us to grasp
and understand the world around us. In order to provide such formal-conceptual representation
physicists must necessarily complement mathematical formalisms, in the syntactic level, with
networks of physical concepts, in the semantic level. This is the reason why, unless a form
of Platonism is taken up whereby mathematics is ontology, it is simply not enough to claim
that “according to QM the structure of the world is like Hilbert space” or that “the quantum
state Ψ describes physical reality”. That is just mixing the semantic and syntactical levels of
the theory. That is not doing the work of providing a conceptual representation in the sense
discussed above. And that is the reason why all physical theories require necessarily a semantic
level. As we argued above, this semantic level is defined not only linguistically and conceptually
but also metaphysically.
In the previous sections we discussed how the notion of entity in classical physics is defined
and constrained by Aristotelian logic and metaphysics through its principles: PE, PNC and PI.
However, as we all know, QM faces severe difficulties to relate its formalism to the constraints
imposed by these classical principles. In the following section we attempt to show how meta-
physical identity has been uncritically applied to vectors in Hilbert space erasing the richness of
the mathematical structure of the theory.
5 Applying Metaphysical Identity to QM
As we argued above, an entity3 in classical physics is always —implicitly or explicitly— meta-
physically defined in terms of PE, PNC and PI. Without such a rigorous (formal and meta-
physical) definition, the notion of ‘physical system’ losses not only its physical content, but also
its applicability. Indeed, without PE it is not possible to make reference to the existence of a
system; without PNC it becomes impossible to describe such system in terms of ‘properties’;
and without PI it would not be possible to follow the system through time —turning ‘evolution’
itself into a meaningless physical notion. Even though it is difficult to find such an explicit
definition within part of a literature which attempts to escape metaphysical debates, there is
always space for implicit definitions. For example, Dieks and Lubberdink make use of these
principles when they discuss the meaning of the indistinguishability of “classical particles”:
“In classical physics, particles are the example par excellence of distinguishable individuals.
No two classical particles can be [assuming PE] in exactly the same physical state: in
Newtonian spacetime different particles will at least occupy different spatial positions at any
moment, because of their impenetrability. They will therefore obey Leibniz’s Principle of
the Identity of Indiscernibles, which says that different individuals [assuming PNC] cannot
share all their physical properties. Moreover, classical particles possess genidentity, i.e.
identity [of non-contradictory properties, PNC] over time [assuming PI].” [20, pp. 2-3]
The orthodox interpretation of QM assumes that a vector in Hilbert space —in analogous
fashion to the interpretation of a point in phase space in classical mechanics— represents the
state of a ‘quantum system’. Of course this interpretation must be accompanied by a coherency
requirement regarding the sound applicability of PE, PNC and PI within the quantum formalism.
In case we want to talk about a system in a sensible manner within the theory, the quantum
system should exist (PE), possess non-contradictory properties (PNC) and remain identical to
itself through time (PI).
3The notions of ‘entity’, ‘system’, ‘object’ play the role of synonyms. These notions make reference to a
specific way of understanding physical reality.
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In the case of QM the application of identity to the formalism has produced the idea that a
quantum state is the same as a superposition. The notions of ‘pure state’, ‘quantum particle’,
‘quantum system’ and ‘quantum superposition’ have been scrambled confusing not only different
mathematical representations of a vector but also different levels of mathematical representation
—levels which have remained unnoticed by philosophers of QM. More importantly, this state of
turmoil has made it impossible to discuss the meaning of quantum superpositions themselves. In
fact, there is no specific notion in the literature to pin down each one of these distinct contextual
elements of the theory. Let us explain this in more detail.
It is common to find within any paper which discusses about QM, in order to present a
superposition state the following equation:
|ψ〉 = N (|a1〉+ |a2〉) (3)
Both sides of the equation are interpreted as describing the same quantum system or individual.
Each one of the kets (|ψ〉, |a1〉, |a2〉) is related to projection operators (|ψ〉〈ψ|, |a1〉〈a1|, |a2〉〈a2|)
which in turn are interpreted as properties which pertain to the quantum system. The —implicit
or explicit— idea behind this interpretational choice is that a quantum system |ψ〉 possess in
some way all the properties that can be found within its multiple representations in terms
of linear combinations. Already here there is a confusion for both terms of Equation (3) are
mathematically equivalent. They are in the same level of mathematical representation —both
are representations of vector in a particular basis. So why do we find this equation in most
papers which discuss about quantum superpositions or quantum systems? Why does everyone
write |ψ〉 in the left hand side of the equation and N (|a1〉 + |a2〉) —or any other superposed
state— in the right hand side of the equation? Is a superposition of one term more important
than one of many terms? Is the left hand side term containing in some way the term in the right
hand side? In fact, through a change of basis we could also write the following equivalence:
N (|a1〉+ |a2〉) = M (|b1〉+ |b2〉) (4)
These obvious remarks expose a deep metaphysical presupposition assumed within the orthodox
literature which is simply not contained in the mathematical formalism of the theory. We
conjecture that this “reading” of the formalism goes back to a deep metaphysical idea of our
Western culture, discussed by the ancient Greeks, namely, the relation between the one and the
many. The idea that the one contains the multiple. An object contains its properties. That
might be the metaphysical scheme behind the choice of writing equation Eq. (3) over of Eq.
(4). However, regardless of such metaphysical orthodox presuppositions, this is not what Eq.
(3) is talking about.
|ψ〉 does not represent an object nor a system according to the orthodox formalism. In the
orthodox interpretation |ψ〉 is interpreted as a “state” of the quantum system which relates to
the projection operator |ψ〉〈ψ|, which in turn is interpreted as a property. N (|a1〉+ |a2〉) is just
another “state”. The only specific mathematical characteristic of |ψ〉 is that it is a superposition
of only one term. But apart from the fact that our culture gives a deep importance to the
number 1, there is no reason why to consider |ψ〉 as “more important” or “special” than any
other mathematical representation of the same vector. Since both |ψ〉 and N (|a1〉 + |a2〉)
are equivalent mathematical representations of the same vector, there is no formal reason that
would allow us to justify why we must write Eq. (3) instead of writing directly the superposition
N (|a1〉+ |a2〉).
We begin to understand how a particular interpretation has been imposed without respecting
the symmetries and features present within the quantum syntax. The congruence relation ‘=’
interpreted in terms of metaphysical identity is implicitly considered as making reference to ‘the
same quantum system’. Through the notion of ‘quantum system’, and also that of ‘pure state’,
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metaphysical identity is implicitly applied to the mathematical formalism. This presupposition
allows us to read the two terms of Eq. (3) as making reference to the same quantum individ-
ual. In order to reinforce this idea it has become a habit in the literature to always write a
superposition of many terms in relation to a superposition of one term. In fact, this is the way
the notion of superposition is taught to physicists in Universities all around the world. As we
shall see, this metaphysical choice has made almost impossible the debate about the meaning
of quantum superpositions beyond classical metaphysics. Even the most obvious fact about
the paraconsistent character of quantum superpositions has been completely overseen in the
literature and remarked only recently by the same authors of this paper [10].
In order to make explicit the distinction between the two different quantum superpositions
in Equations (3) and (4), in [14] one of us has proposed to consider these different mathematical
representations through an explicit contextual definition of the notion of quantum superposition
which considers right from the start their obvious basis-dependent character. This is only a first
step in order to escape the orthodox “common sense” semantics imposed by classical metaphysics.
Let us recall the contextual definition of quantum superpositions:
Definition 5.1 Quantum Superposition: Given a quantum state, Ψ, each i-basis defines a
particular mathematical representation of Ψ,
∑
ci |αi〉, which we call a quantum superposition.
The notion of quantum superposition is contextual for it is always defined in terms of a particular
context (or basis).
This definition has not been made explict in the orthodox literature due to to the application
of metaphysical identity within the interpretation of a vector in Hilbert space. The abstract
vector Ψ is equated with a particular mathematical representation given by a superposition of
one element |ψ〉. This, we argue, is a mistake.
The application of metaphysical identity hides two very important distinctions when attempt-
ing to interpret the formalism. Firstly, the distinction between different quantum superpositions;
and secondly, the distinction —to which we now turn— between the one abstract vector, Ψ,
and its multiple basis dependent mathematical representations,
∑
ci |αi〉.
From a formal perspective, all bases have exactly the same importance. The ket |ψ〉 is just
a particular mathematical representation given by the choice of a specific basis of the abstract
vector Ψ. From a formal perspective, as we remarked above, there is no reason to consider this
basis as “more important” or “special” than any other basis. There is in fact an infinite number
of i-representations of this vector which depend on the choice of the particular i-basis. In this
case, the one abstract vector Ψ contains its multiple representations. But Ψ is not |ψ〉. In order
to make explicit the two different levels, which have been mixed in the orthodox literature, we
can write the following equation:
Ψ = N (|a1〉+ |a2〉) = M(|b1〉+ |b2〉) = |ψ〉 = ... = K(|r1〉+ |r2〉) (5)
The important point we want to remark is that the semantic interpretation of Equation (5)
is not at all “obvious” nor “self evident”. One cannot “read literally” the existence of a ‘system’
or of ‘properties’ from this equation. The orthodox interpretation which assumes that all these
mathematical representations are making reference to the same quantum system is certainly not
the only possible interpretation that one could produce. As we remarked above, the idea that
all the terms of Equation (5) are considered to be the same becomes evident when we recall
there does not exist a specific notion, within the orthodox interpretation, that would allow us to
distinguish between the different terms. This is done irrespectively of the contextual character of
QM which points exactly in the opposite direction, namely, to the fact there exists an important
specificity regarding each particular expression.
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Irrespectively of quantum contextuality, Equation (5) has been interpreted through the choice
of a language —following classical metaphysics— containing noncontextual notions like ‘system’
and ‘property’. What might seem as “harmless” or even “self evident” presupposition is in fact
a strong metaphysical choice which applies metaphysical identity where, in fact, there is only
a congruence relation. As we have shown, the danger of the uncritical choice of a language
(a semantic) —which imposes definite metaphysical commitments— comes from the limit it
imposes on the very possibilities of analysis. In this respect, we might also recall the old
positivist lesson according to which the use of inadequate concepts within a language can only
lead to the creation of pseudoproblems.
In orthodox QM metaphysical identity is applied implicitly. This makes it very difficult to
debate about the adequacy of its applicability. Fortunately for us, there is an interpretation
which not only makes an explicit use of this principle but also derives the natural conclusion from
its application, namely, Dieks’ modal interpretation of QM. In fact, it is the strict application of
this principle within the orthodox formalism which leads Dieks to conclude that QM describes
systems which have only one single real property.
6 Dieks’ Conclusion: Quantum Systems Possess Only One
Real Property
Dieks’ realist modal approach to QM [17, 18, 19] attempts to interpret the orthodox formalism
in terms of systems which possess definite valued (actual) properties. Modal interpretations are
constrained by four general ideas or desiderata (see for a detailed analysis [35]).
i. We should stay close to the orthodox formalism of QM which has been proven to be empir-
ically adequate.
ii. We should attempt to provide an objective realist description of what is going on according
to the theory beyond the mere reference to measurement outcomes in an instrumentalist
fashion.
iii. The proposed objective description should be in terms of systems which possess actual
(definite valued) properties.
iv. We must provide such interpretation of the orthodox formalism without “adding anything by
hand” —such as ad hoc rules—, respecting the symmetries and features of the mathematical
structure.
From these constraints Dieks derives the only possible conclusion: each quantum system pos-
sesses only one single actual property. Let us discuss in some detail his interpretation of the
formalism.
According to Dieks, given a vector in Hilbert space, Φ, there is only one real (actual) property
related to this quantum system. In order to find this property we just need to write Φ in the
specific basis in which the state is mathematically represented as a superposition of one single
term: |φ〉. The ket |φ〉 has a one-to-one relation to the projection operator, |φ〉〈φ|, which
in turn is interpreted as an actual property. Why is this property called “actual”? Because,
following Einstein’s actualist definition of element of physical reality,4 this property can be
predicted with certainty (probability = 1). On the contrary, the kets related to properties
4We might recall Einstein’s definition [23, p. 777] of an element of physical reality: “If, without in any way
disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of reality corresponding to that quantity.”
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that appear within quantum superpositions of more than one term cannot be predicted with
certainty and thus cannot be considered as being actual (or real) properties. The properties
which pertain to superpositions of more than one term are called in the literature indefinite
properties because —due to certain constraints which we will analyze in the next section—
they cannot be interpreted as definite valued properties. Dieks, following a tradition that goes
back to Heisenberg’s interpretation and quantum logic, calls them possible properties (see for
example[18]).
Thus, if we ask the question: what is real according to Ψ? The answer provided by Dieks’
modal interpretation is that there is only one actual real property, |φ〉〈φ|, and many possible
ones, |Ki〉〈Ki|. According to Dieks’ interpretation possible properties might also produce in the
future measurement outcomes. However, strictly speaking, these properties cannot be considered
as part of reality. In a more or less covered instrumentalist fashion, Dieks interprets possible
properties in terms of the prediction of future measurement outcomes. But this, as mentioned
above, goes against desiderata (ii) which promised an objective description of properties beyond
the mere reference to measurement outcomes. As in most realist interpretations of QM, indefinite
properties remain in an ontological limbo: even though they are not real, they relate to the
prediction of measurement outcomes. However, this ontological distinction between a real actual
property and the many possible properties, is not derived from the mathematical formalism of the
theory. This distinction is imposed by a reading which —like in the hidden variables program—
presupposes the Newtonian metaphysical stance according to which ‘Reality = Actuality’.5
Dieks’ modal interpretation is a coherent scheme. However, due to the (metaphysical) de-
mand to discuss the formalism of QM in terms of ‘systems with definite valued properties’ (iii)
and the constraints imposed by Kochen-Specker (KS) type theorems to modal interpretations
[2, 16, 22, 34], Dieks is forced to conclude that quantum systems have only one real property.
Dieks modal interpretation, as many proposals in the same line of quantum logic, leaves outside
of the realm of physical reality the indefinite or possible properties described and probabilis-
tically predicted by the quantum formalism. This interpretational maneuver contradicts the
intuition of physicists according to which physical reality must be directly related to the predic-
tive capacity of the formalism of the theory. As Robert Griffiths [26, p. 361] makes the point:
“If a theory makes a certain amount of sense and gives predictions which agree reasonably well
with experimental or observational results, scientists are inclined to believe that its logical and
mathematical structure reflects the structure of the real world in some way, even if philosophers
will remain permanently skeptical.”
In QM, given a vector Φ, we know that all its mathematical representations, given in general
by superpositions of more than one term,
∑
ci|di〉, which are constituted by indefinite or possi-
ble properties do provide —even though probabilistically— empirically meaningful predictions.
So why should these properties not be considered when discussing about physical reality? It
becomes evident that, leaving aside metaphysical actualism, realist interpretations should take
into account not only actual properties but also possible ones when considering what is real ac-
cording to the quantum formalism (see for a detailed analysis of this point [13]). As mentioned
above, the reason behind this minimalist interpretation is related to the well known constraints
imposed by KS type theorems to modal interpretations. We completely agree with Dieks that
this is the only rigorous conclusion which can be drawn when considering, on the one hand, the
orthodox formalism of QM —through desiderata (i) and (iv)—, and on the other, the meta-
physical constraints imposed by the notions of ‘system’ and ‘property’ —through desiderata (ii)
and (iii).
5It is interesting to notice that Guido Bacciagaluppi always considered modal interpretations as a hidden
variable interpretation (see [3]). Dieks was against this idea until, in a paper of 2007, changed drastically his
position reconsidering modal interpretations in relation to Bohmian mechanics (see [18]).
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7 Revisiting the Applicability of Metaphysical Identity in
QM
As obvious as it might sound, in order claim that ‘something is the same to itself’ we need to
specify what is the ‘something’ in question which remains ‘the same’. In the case of classical
physics, as we discussed above, before applying metaphysical identity, we need to apply PE and
PNC. The first principle allows to make the claim that the ‘something’ in question exists (PE);
the second principle, that this existent is constituted by non-contradictory properties (PNC).
Both of these statements face serious difficulties when related to the orthodox formalism of QM.
The first difficulty relates to quantum contextuality —understood in ontological terms through
the KS theorem6— which precludes the possibility to interpret projection operators in terms of
preexistent or actual (definite valued) properties. Let us discuss this more in detail.
In QM the frames under which a vector is represented mathematically are considered in
terms of orthonormal bases. We say that a set {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ H, an n-dimensional Hilbert
space, is an orthonormal basis if 〈xi|xj〉 = 0 for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and 〈xi|xi〉 = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
A physical quantity is represented by a self-adjoint operator on the Hilbert space H. We say
that A is a context if A is a commutative subalgebra generated by a set of self-adjoint bounded
operators {A1, . . . , As} of H. Quantum contextuality, which was most explicitly recognized
through the KS theorem [28], asserts that a value ascribed to a physical quantity A cannot be
part of a global assignment of values but must, instead, depend on some specific context from
which A is to be considered.
Physically, a global valuation allows us to define the preexistence of definite properties.
Mathematically, a valuation over an algebra A of self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space, is a
real function satisfying,
1. Value-Rule (VR): For any A ∈ A, the value v(A) belongs to the spectrum of A, v(A) ∈
σ(A).
2. Functional Composition Principle (FUNC): For any A ∈ A and any real-valued function
f , v(f(A)) = f(v(A)).
We say that the valuation is a Global Valuation (GV) if A is the set of all bounded, self-adjoint
operators. In case A is a context, we say that the valuation is a Local Valuation (LV). We call
the mathematical property which allows us to paste consistently together multiple contexts of
LVs into a single GV, Value Invariance (VI). First assume that a GV v exists and consider a
family of contexts {Ai}I . Define the LV vi := v|Ai over each Ai. Then it is easy to verify that
the set {vi}I satisfies the Compatibility Condition (CC),
vi|Ai∩Aj = vj |Ai∩Aj , ∀i, j ∈ I.
The CC is a necessary condition that must satisfy a family of LVs in order to determine a GV.
We say that the algebra of self-adjoint operators is VI if for every family of contexts {Ai}I and
LVs vi : Ai → R satisfying the CC, there exists a GV v such that v|Ai = vi.
If we have VI, and hence, a GV exists, this would allow us to give values to all magnitudes
at the same time maintaining a CC in the sense that whenever two magnitudes share one or
more projectors, the values assigned to those projectors are the same in every context. The KS
theorem, in algebraic terms, rules out the existence of GVs when the dimension of the Hilbert
space is greater than 2. The following theorem is an adaptation of the KS theorem —as stated
in [21, Theorem 3.2]— to the case of contexts:
6See [15] for a detailed analysis and discussion of the meaning of quantum contextuality.
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Theorem 7.1 (KS Theorem) If H is a Hilbert space of dim(H) > 2, then a global valuation
is not possible.
KS makes reference to the interpretation of the quantum formalism in terms of systems with
actual (definite valued) properties. Put in a nutshell, quantum contextuality deals with the
formal conditions that any realist interpretation which respects orthodox Hilbert space QM
must consider in order to consistently provide an objective physical representation of reality.
These conditions preclude the possibility of interpreting any quantum state, Ψ, in terms of a
set of definite valued properties. The principle of metaphysical identity cannot be applied to
‘something which possesses objective properties’ in the context of QM due to the fact there is
no objective way in order to define the ‘something’ in question in terms of ‘possessed objective
properties’ (see for a more detailed analysis [15]).
The second barrier in order to apply metaphysical identity to QM deals with the superpo-
sition principle and the existence of ‘Schrödinger cat states’ of the type: c1| ↑x> + c2| ↓x>.
As we argued in [10], quantum superpositions seem to imply the need of making reference to
contradictory properties. This remark precludes the very possibility to interpret superpositions
in terms of metaphysical identities. Let us recall that an existent physical individual or sys-
tem (PE) must obviously posses non-contradictory properties (PNC) in order to be regarded
as identical to itself (PI). According to classical metaphysics ‘something’ cannot be in contra-
dictory states simultaneously: ‘up’ and ‘down’, ‘dead’ and ‘alive’, etc. But according to the
quantum formalism —and due to the impossibility to interpret quantum probability in epis-
temic terms—, so it seems, the same ‘quantum particle’ can posses simultaneously the property
of ‘being decayed’ and the property of ‘being not-decayed’; a ‘quantum system’ can have ‘spin
up’ and ‘spin down’ at the same time. Obviously, a system cannot be defined in terms of para-
consistent properties. One cannot apply metaphysical identity without the sound application
of PNC. Contradictory properties preclude the very possibility of discussing about a physical
system or individual. As we explained above, accepting contradictory properties to character-
ize a ‘quantum system’ would be going against the basic metaphysical definition of what can
be considered to be a ‘physical system’. Arguing that all this is due to the “quantumness” of
elementary particles is just escaping the problem of properly accounting and making sense of
such quantum realm. Saying that things are weird because they are quantum is not providing
a proper physical representation.
As we discussed in the previous section, if one applies the modal interpretation’s constraints,
(i) and (iv), to stay close to the orthodox formalism of QM, and to describe physical reality
(ii) in terms of systems with definite valued properties (iii) —implicitly applying PE, PNC and
PI—; then one cannot escape the natural conclusion derived by Dieks: A vector in Hilbert space
represents reality objectively in terms of one single property. However, there are difficulties with
such an interpretation of QM.
Firstly, a system which possess only one property seems to be not a very interesting physical
system. It is even difficult to imagine what a single property system would be like. Furthermore,
the reference to possible properties remains completely unclear.
Secondly, this interpretation obscures the richness of the formalism. On the one hand, it
bypasses the specificity of the multiple mathematical representations of an abstract vector as
well as their contextual character —discussed in the previous sections. On the other hand,
the distinction between different levels of mathematical representation is overlooked due to an
interpretation which makes an implicit application of metaphysical identity.
Thirdly, even though the so called indefinite or possible properties are the main elements
of new quantum technologies —due to metaphysical actualism— their relation to physical real-
ity remains completely unspecified. Such a description seems completely incapable to explain
—independently of measurement outcomes— the existence of quantum superpositions and en-
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tanglement, two of the most important features within quantum information processing. Quan-
tum superpositions are being tested today in the lab. Despite the many interpretations which
attempt to deny their physical existence, Schrödinger cats are getting fat and bigger [5, 29, 31].7
8 Final Remarks
Michel Bitbol [4, p. 72] makes the following interesting remark: “The tendency to reify state
vectors [in QM] manifests itself in the use of the very word ‘state’. The ‘grammar’ (in Wittgen-
stein’s sense) of the word ‘state’ requires that this is the state of something; that it belongs to
something; that it characterizes this something independently of anything else. Such grammar,
and the conception associated to it, is sufficient to generate one of the major aspects of the mea-
surement problem.” In this paper, from a realist perspective, we are certainly not criticizing the
reification of vectors. A realist obviously needs to explain in which sense the formalism relates
to a particular representation of reality. What we have attempted to show is that the grammar
imposed by the word ‘state’ and ‘system’ is simply not adequate to interpret QM. This does not
invalidate realism itself —as many, including Bitbol seem to argue—, it simply makes explicit
the inadequacy of the classical metaphysical scheme when related to the orthodox formalism of
QM. This does not preclude the possibility to develop new metaphysical schemes that would
allow us to explain what is QM really talking about.
In classical physics the mathematical structures that are used are based on classical logic.
But classical logic is also one of the formal cornerstones of the metaphysics of entities. We know
that the mathematical structure of QM has features which go clearly against the basic principles
of classical logic, and in particular, the principle of identity. Thus, it would be then a strong
surprise, that such non-classical mathematical syntactic structure could be interpreted following
the same semantic and classical concepts that have been used to interpret classical physics. It
seems to us clear that, from a philosophical perspective, we should not expect a priori this to
be necessarily the case.
We are convinced that imposing uncritically a metaphysical interpretation that is simply not
coherent with the formalism will not help us in understanding what the theory is really talking
about. On the very contrary, as we have attempted to show in this paper, assuming improper
metaphysical schemes in the semantic level will certainly obscure the features already present
within the formalism itself in the syntactic level. It is in fact these non-classical features which,
we believe, are the main elements which should be considered when attempting to develop
a coherent interpretation of QM that respects the orthodox formalism. In short, we should
learn from the mathematical formalism of the theory instead of uncritically imposing, implicitly
(as in the orthodox interpretation) or explicitly (as in the hidden variable project), a classical
metaphysical scheme based on metaphysical identity.
The relation between a mathematical formalism (in the syntactic level) and a set of physical
concepts (in the semantic level) cannot be considered —in general— as “self evident”. Physical
concepts can not be “read out literally” from the formalism —as some authors might claim.
Physics is neither committed to classical concepts and language —as others believe.8 Quite on
7In this respect, it should become clear that a necessary requirement for discussing the development of
quantum information processing is to posses a rigorous definition of quantum superpositions such as the one
proposed in [14].
8Our statement goes clearly against the Bohrian [36, p. 7] stance according to which: “[...] the unambiguous
interpretation of any measurement must be essentially framed in terms of classical physical theories, and we may
say that in this sense the language of Newton and Maxwell will remain the language of physicists for all time.”
In this respect, also according to Bohr [Op. cit.], “it would be a misconception to believe that the difficulties
of the atomic theory may be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by new conceptual
forms.”
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the contrary, the history of physics is also the history of the creation of new physical concepts.
The authors of this paper believe that the concept of ‘physical object’ or ‘physical system’ is a
notion that was created and developed through the history of physics; it is not a true concept
that we have discovered in a Platonic heaven; and neither it is a concept that must necessarily
constrain all our present and future physical theories. In particular, as we have argued, it might
not constrain QM.
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